A virtual power plant is proposed to aggregate various distributed renewable resources with controllable resources to overcome the uncertainty and volatility of the renewables so as to improve market involvement. As the virtual power plant capacity becomes remarkable, it behaves as a strategic price maker rather than price taker in the market for higher profit. In this work, a two-stage bi-level bidding and scheduling model is proposed to study the virtual power plant strategic behaviors as a price maker. A mathematical problem with an equilibrium constraints-based method is applied to solve the problem by transforming the two level problem into a single level multi-integer linear problem. Considering the deficiency of computational burden and implausible assumptions of conventional stochastic optimization, we introduce interval numbers to represent the predicted output of uncertainty resources in a real-time stage. The pessimism degree-based method is utilized to order the preferences of profit intervals and tradeoff between expected profit and uncertainty. An imbalance cost mitigation mechanism is proposed in this pessimism degree-based interval optimization manner. Results show that the bidding price directly affects the cleared day ahead of the locational marginal price for higher profit. Interior conventional generators, energy storage and interruptible loads are comprehensively optimized to cover potential power shortage or profit from market. Moreover, controllable resources can decrease or even wipe out the uncertainty through the imbalance cost mitigation mechanism when the negative deviation charge is high. Finally, a sensitivity analysis reveals the effect of interval parameter setting upon optimization results. Moreover, a virtual power plant operator with a higher pessimism degree pursues higher profit with higher uncertainty.
Introduction

Background
Renewable energy is prevailed in the past due to environmental concern. Therefore, large amounts of renewable energy resources, such as Wind Power (WP), are widely installed on the demand side [1, 2] . However, most distributed installed renewable resources cannot be scheduled by power system operators because of intermittent output and a "fit and forget" installation approach [3] . Furthermore, these distributed energy resources cannot individually profit from energy market. The uncertain output makes renewables vulnerable to imbalance costs [1, 4, 5] .
In order to reduce the uncertainty of renewable energy, one of the methods is to aggregate Uncertain Resources (UR) with dispatchable units. Nowadays, with the development of smart meters and smart grid technology, various Distributed Energy Resources (DER) can be flexibly interconnected 1. 3 
. Main Contribution and Layout of the Paper
To summarize, the main contribution and novelty include three aspects: Firstly, compared with most other VPP bidding strategy research, VPP here behaves as a price maker in the DA market rather than a price taker. A bi-level two-stage model is proposed: the UL optimizes VPP profit, and LL simulates DA market clearing. The model is solved by the MPEC method.
Secondly, most other MPEC-based method price maker research focuses on homogenous resources, whereas in this paper, VPP, which integrates various DERs, coordinately schedules the inner resources.
Thirdly, the majority of research applies a stochastic method to deal with uncertainties in the model. In this paper, the URs are represented by interval numbers instead of conventional scenarios. Pessimism degree-based interval optimization is applied to design an uncertainty mitigation mechanism. The scheduling mechanism effectively restrains the imbalance cost caused by UR. Compared with former interval optimization works, network constraints and price maker consideration make this work more practical.
To sum up, the proposed two-stage bi-level bidding and scheduling interval optimization model is applied to optimize VPP's bidding and scheduling strategy in the DA and RT market. The layout of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the interval optimization method and procedure. Section 3 builds the VPP bidding and scheduling model. Section 4 tests the model with 6 cases and analyzes the simulation results. Section 5 consolidates the conclusions.
Methods and Solving Procedure
Uncertainty Characterizaion by Interval Optimization
We classify the aggregated DERs of VPP into uncertain and controllable resources. The Interruptible Loads (IL), Energy Storage (ES) devices and Conventional Generators (CG) are controllable. WP and loads inside VPP are uncertain. In the DA stage, the actual output of WP and loads in the RT stage are forecasted to calculate the potential imbalance cost. Conventional research uses stochastic optimization which generates scenarios to represent the possible outcome of uncertain resources. Additionally, the distribution function and probability of each scenario are usually empirically assumed. These assumptions may be wrong.
However, the interval interpretation method is not affected by these problems. In the following, we introduce the interval definition, basic calculation and ordering rules with the forecasted wind power, load and profit. Interval numbers can be presented by left and right bounds which are the respective minimum and maximum possible outcomes of uncertain variables [31] . As (1) shows, the predicted wind power P W t can be any value within the interval P W t , constrained by the left and right bounds P W,L t , P W,R t . In this paper, the bold font variables are interval numbers. Additionally, the superscripts L and R represent the respective left and right bounds.
Another equivalent way to define the interval number is shown in (2) . Midpoint m(P W t ) and width m(P W t ) are defined by the left and right bound according to (3) and (4) . The midpoint shows the expected level of the uncertain variable, while the width denotes the uncertainty. A wider interval means more outcomes of uncertain variables and hence indicates higher uncertainty [31] . The conserved decision maker of VPP can apply a larger interval width so as to cover more possibility.
where: m(P W t ) = P W,L t + P W,R t /2, ∀t
m(P W t ) = P W,R t − P W,L t /2, ∀t
A practical way to obtain an interval is to apply the minimum and maximum historical outcome of the same period to denote the potential range of uncertain variables.
Base on the above definition, the early interval optimization works [28, 29] transform the interval optimization problem to independent best and worst case problems, i.e., the worst case is inputted with the worst condition of all the uncertain variables and forms the worst results, while the best case is the opposite. The two isolated cases involve no calculation and ordering among interval inputs and results, and consequently, the width and midpoint of profit interval are actually not optimized.
According to the calculation rule of intervals in [31] , the worst case is not a "worst plus worst" issue. For example, the lowest outcome P net,L t of the net output interval P net t is derived when wind power reaches the left bound P W,L t while load reaches the right bound L R t (5), rather than P W,L t subtracted by L L t . On the contrary, Equation (6) illustrates the highest outcome P net,R t .
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In the midpoint and width presenting manner (7) and (8), the midpoint and width of net output are calculated. According to the interval calculation rule, the interval width accumulates even in subtraction (8) [31] .
Specifically focusing on profit intervals, we need interval ordering rules to figure the optimum profit interval. The interval ordering problem becomes confusing when intervals overlap. As Figure 1 shows, profit Ahas a smaller width, in other words, less uncertainty. On the other hand, profit Bhas a bigger midpoint, which means a higher expected value. 
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Specifically focusing on profit intervals, we need interval ordering rules to figure the optimum profit interval. The interval ordering problem becomes confusing when intervals overlap. As Figure  1 shows, profit A has a smaller width, in other words, less uncertainty. On the other hand, profit B has a bigger midpoint, which means a higher expected value. The pessimism degree-based method is implemented to conduct the tradeoff between the width and midpoint. The pessimism degree is a parameter within the range of [0,1] to define the willingness of a decision maker towards uncertainty. Higher pessimism indicates higher acceptance of uncertainty. The necessary and sufficient condition of A < B is (9) . Hence, by transforming the object function to the tradeoff function in (9) , the width and midpoint of profit interval are comprehensively optimized. The mathematical proving process is based on fuzzy methodology. A more detailed introduction can be found in our previous work [17, 32] . Research [30] first introduced this method in a study of coordinated dispatching of wind power and hydro power. Research [17] investigated the price taker VPP's medium-term bidding strategy, representing UR and market price in interval numbers.
Market Structure and Price Maker Decition Procedure
In this paper, a typical pool-based two-stage market is applied. The market structure and VPP's role are described in Figure 2 . The pessimism degree-based method is implemented to conduct the tradeoff between the width and midpoint. The pessimism degree is a parameter within the range of [0,1] to define the willingness of a decision maker towards uncertainty. Higher pessimism indicates higher acceptance of uncertainty. The necessary and sufficient condition of A < B is (9) . Hence, by transforming the object function to the tradeoff function in (9) , the width and midpoint of profit interval are comprehensively optimized. The mathematical proving process is based on fuzzy methodology. A more detailed introduction can be found in our previous work [17, 32] . Research [30] first introduced this method in a study of coordinated dispatching of wind power and hydro power. Research [17] investigated the price taker VPP's medium-term bidding strategy, representing UR and market price in interval numbers.
In this paper, a typical pool-based two-stage market is applied. The market structure and VPP's role are described in Figure 2 . In the DA stage, VPP, power producers and demands submit hourly bid curves and capacity parameters to ISO for the next operating day. The bidding curve of the power producer is a non-decreasing piece-wise price function against power. On the other hand, the bidding curve of demand is a decreasing function [18, 33] . Different from conventional producers or demands, VPP can aggregate DERs in a subsystem In the DA stage, VPP, power producers and demands submit hourly bid curves and capacity parameters to ISO for the next operating day. The bidding curve of the power producer is a non-decreasing piece-wise price function against power. On the other hand, the bidding curve of demand is a decreasing function [18, 33] . Different from conventional producers or demands, VPP can aggregate DERs in a subsystem which exchanges power with the main grid through a common point. The EMS of VPP acts as a market agent and operator of those DERs. The VPP bid curve in this work is simplified as an hourly price like reference [21] . The simplification is effective because the producer bid curve slope is shallow. Moreover, it brings clearness in analysis. Similarly, many supply function researchers also use intercept as a bid strategy [33] .
Notice that VPP is assumed to be the only strategic player in market, because this work is in the viewpoint of VPP. If the other market participants are assumed as strategic players, this work turns to market equilibria study; also, the related approach is different. The assumption here is the same as [2, 20, 21] . Therefore, the other producers and demands are bidding at their marginal cost or utility, which are therefore known to VPP [2, 20] .
In Figure 2 , the white arrow is VPP's bid price. The cleared power for each participant is figured out by ISO according to the bid curves. The blue arrows represent the power exchanges. LMP is calculated from the dual variable of the node power balance equation, which is also known as the shade price [34] . The DC load flow method is applied in network formulation. ISO pays for the cleared power of each participant at LMP. The red arrow is payment or purchase.
The RT market is operated minutes before actual power delivery [34] . In the RT market, participants who cannot meet up with the DA cleared power are charged. The shortage part according to the DA schedule is charged at Negative Deviation Price (NDP). NDP is higher than DA market LMP to ensure that VPP can buy the needed power to fill the gap. Meanwhile, surplus output is sold at the Positive Deviation Price (PDP). The PDP is relatively lower than the DA market LMP to ensure other market participants will buy the surplus part [1, 19] .
The decision makers of VPP predict the intervals of UR output. VPP also has to comprehensively consider the given NDP and PDP, the dispachable DER operation cost, the interruptible load cost, and retail price of the inner load. Provided with the above information, a VPP decision maker then optimizes the unbalanced cost, incomes and DA incomes and figures out the optimum bidding and scheduling strategy.
VPP Bidding and Scheduling Model
Upper Level Problem: VPP Strategy
The upper level problem aims at maximizing VPP's profit. Due to uncertain resources in VPP, the expected profit is uncertain and is interpreted as an interval number. According to the Pessimism Degree (PD)-based interval ordering rule, the optimized results are calculated from the midpoint m(Profi) and width of profit w(Profi) referring to (10) . PD ζ indicates EMS's preference between the expected profit value m(Profi) and uncertainty level w(Profi).
where
In Equation (13), α DA n,t P VPP,DA t defines the income or payment to the main grid. α DA n,t is the LMP of node n where the VPP is connected. P VPP,DA t is the cleared power. It is positive when the VPPs supply Energies 2019, 12, 3662 7 of 22 redundant energy to DA market, and negative when VPPs purchase energy. Notice that both of them are decision variables of ISO in the lower level. Lincome t is the income interval from the integrated load in VPP, and Equations (14) and (15) define the lowest and highest value. The consumed power interval in VPP reaches the bottom when the forecast load is at the left bound L L t and IL is at the right bound P IL,R t and vice versa. The rest of the terms in (10)-(13) are hourly operation costs of CG, ES, deployed IL remedy and imbalance cost, respectively. λ IL t is calculated as a portion of retail price λ retail t . Equations (16) and (17) Let both sides of Equation (21) be subtracted by Equation (20) . The uncertainty mitigation strategy implemented by a controllable resource against UR is expressed in Equation (24) . The net uncertainty of UR is supposed to be covered by the width of CG, ES, IL. Hence, the imbalance cost can be mitigated by those controllable resources, according to the definition of the imbalance cost (16) and (17) . (25) limits the strategic bidding price non-negative and no more than the market upper bound.
The following constraints illustrate the limits of individual components in VPP. Firstly, the reference value of uncertain power such as wind power P W, f t should be inside the respective forecast interval (26) and (27) .
Lower Level Problem: ISO Market Clearing Simulation
The lower lever problem aims at maximizing social utility in the view of ISO operating the main grid. The three product terms in (41) are from demands, VPP and other generating companies in sequence. Note that the VPP bid price β VPP,DA t is strategically decided, while others are non-strategic and stick to their marginal cost, λ D,DA t,d,db and λ O,DA j,b
, respectively. The bidding price is a decision variable of the upper level and input as parameter in the lower level problem.
The following are the constraints of the lower lever problem. Equation (42) manifests the main grid DA market power balance. For any node and time slot, the net generated and consumed power is equal to the total injection power. VPP ∈ Ψn is the node where the VPP managed sub system is connected. m ∈ Θn represents transmission lines connecting node n. All the variables on the right side of the colon are dual variables in the following context. Here, LMP α DA n,t is the shade price. It economically interprets the scarcity of certain resources which represent the available electricity here. The shade price is widely utilized as DA market LMP in many studies.
Constraint (43) is the upper and lower limits of cleared power submitted by VPP to ISO, deduced from (44) 
Constraints (46) and (47) illustrate the limits of cleared power submitted by non-strategic producer and demands.
Constraint (48) defines the power flow limits of transmission line. The load angle of each node constraint is shown in (49), and node1 is set to be the reference bus and the load angle is 0 at any time (50).
Model Transformation and Linearization
The lower level problem is linear and convex. Therefore, its optimality can be substituted by Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions, which are listed in Appendix A. However, the product α DA t,n P VPP,DA t in the upper level problem is not linear because both α DA t,n and P VPP,DA t are decision variables. Referring to [18, 21] , the linearization process utilizes the strong duality condition and complementary slackness condition with the KKT equation to derive the linearized form (51). The detail process is listed in Appendix B.
All the complementary slackness conditions are nonlinear because of the product of dual variable and primal variable. This linearization is realized by introducing an additional binary decision variable s VPP,t t . M VPP is given a large enough constant, which is around 100 times that of the corresponding dual variable. The linearized form of (43) is (52)-(55), while the rest is described in Appendix B.
Case Studies
Parameters
The main grid system topology in Figure 3 is modified based on a network provided by reference [18] . The left side of the network is formed as a source side, while the right side of the network is the demand side. The generating companies O1, O2, O3 operate large conventional generators referring to rows 1 to 3 of Table 1 . The major demands D2, D3, D4 are located on the right side. The total demand is 800 MW. D1, D2, D3 and D4 share 10%, 30%, 30% and 30% of the total demand, respectively. D1 represents those industrial loads directly supplied by generators in practice. Hence, line 2-4 and line 3-6 basically transmit power from the source side on the left to the demand side on the right. The susceptance B nm of all the transmission line of the main grid is 9.412 per unit [18] . Both generating companies and load bidding curve parameters are from [18] . The generating companies O1, O2, O3, O4 bid competitively at marginal cost. Table 1 . Therefore, a piece-wise bidding curve for each of each power block is from row 4 to 7 in Table 1 . The respective cost or bidding price is from row 8 to 11 in Table 1 . Therefore, a piece-wise bidding curve for each generating company is formed. Figure 4 depicts the time varying curves of D4 intuitively. All four demands share the same bid curve, and also bid competitively at marginal utility. The blocks of each demand share 90%, 2.5%, 2.5%, 2.5%, 2.5% of their maximum in sequence. For example, the maximum demand of D4 is 240 MW, which is obtained from the total demand 800 MW multiplied by the percentage 30%. The maximum power of each respective demand block is <216, 6, 6, 6, 6> MW. The bid price in the order of blocks is <24.968, 22.628, 20.876, 20.606, 20.378>$/MWh in hour 11. The demand bid curve is generally high in peak hours and low in valley hours. Detailed parameters of the four demands refer to Table 2 in [18] . Parameter ES is from reference [35] . It has a maximum level of 30 MWh and the initial status is 8 MWh. Both the charge and discharge maximum power are 4.5 MW with the efficiency factor at 0.9. The operation cost is 9.2$/MW. The installed capacity of WP is 125 MW and the wind speed parameter is from Bishop Clerks data [36] . WP is calculated from wind speed according to the method in reference [37] . The load data are from the PJM historical data miner [38] . The calculated net output of UR of VPP according to (20)-(24) is depicted in Figure 5 . The red intervals on the top of the bars describe the width of the hourly forecast value, while the height of the blue bars is the midpoint. The width in practice can be wide enough to cover all possible value. Here, in case 1, the width is set 5% of the mid value. The negative parts in Figure 5 show that the load is higher than renewable power in these time slots. The network constraints of the subsystem are not considered due to the relatively small scale.
Apart from VPP, generating company O4 is also connected with node 6 to analyze the interaction with VPP. Its capacity is relatively small, representing non-strategic distributed generation. The retail price is typical peak, valley, shoulder price. The IL remedy λ IL t is set to be 0.7 times of the retail price. PDP λ im+ t and NDP λ im− t are set to 0.4 and 1.8 times, respectively, of DA market price. All the hourly price curves are shown in Figure 6 . Finally, the model is solved by IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimization Studio 12.4, which is widely used in solving MILP.
VPP Bid and Scheduling Results in DA Market
In case 1, we investigate the optimized VPP strategy in the DA market based on the parameter Finally, the model is solved by IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimization Studio 12.4, which is widely used in solving MILP.
In case 1, we investigate the optimized VPP strategy in the DA market based on the parameter setting in the second column of Table 2 . All the parameter settings of the other following cases are also consolidated in this table. The optimized bid price of VPP directly affects DA market clearing and it equals the DA LMP of node 6. As the blue line with dots in Figure 7 In hour 5, VPP bids at 16.886$/MWh, equal to the LMP. The bid price of the first block of D4 is also 16.886$/MWh, as Figure 4 shows. Therefore, the cleared power should be within the first block of D4, due to the decreasing demand bidding curve. In this case, the cleared demand of D4 is 0s, because the valley demands bid is low. Therefore, the strategic VPP bidding price made the traded power to D4 zero. On the other hand, the cleared power of VPP is 56.631 MW. The power flow of line 3-5, line 4-5, line 5-6 is 131.874 MW, −53.670 MW and −134.835 MW, respectively. Based on power flows of related lines, the UR output is scheduled to supply other nodes. The resulting DA income of this hour is 956.271$. To conclude, VPP manipulates the LMP to decide the cleared power. If the offering price of demand is low, its strategy will limit the cleared power.
In hour 18, the peak demand status occurs as Figure 4 shows. VPP bids at 24.968$/MW. The bid curve of D4 is <25, 24.968, 22.628, 20.876, 20.606>$/MW in the order of blocks. Hence, the LMP is 24.968$/MW at the second block. The cleared power of D4 is 216 MW, which is much higher than the outcome of hour 5. Therefore, VPP's bid let more demand to be cleared considering the profitable peak hour price. The traded power is 73.84 MW. It is also higher than the cleared power of hour 5. The resulting DA income of this hour increases to 1843.637$. Besides, considering the high market price, O4 is also fully activated at 60 MW as the grey bar shows. Therefore, VPP strategically bids for more scheduled power and thus more income when demand bids are high.
In hour 24, VPP bids and manipulates LMP to 17.94$/MWh, which is lower than all the bid prices of O4 referring to column 5 of Table 1 . Consequently, O4 is not activated. In contrast, the cleared power for VPP is 54.719 MW. Furthermore, the predicted UR output in VPP of this moment is [49.96, 65.76] MW. This means VPP utilizes the zero cost UR to bid at a low price. Contrarily, O4 is a competitive conventional generator and its bid price is fixed and relatively high. To conclude, VPP can strategically manipulate the LMP to let its resources scheduled in prior to the other competitive generator on the same node.
prices of O4 referring to column 5 of Table 1 . Consequently, O4 is not activated. In contrast, the cleared power for VPP is 54.719 MW. Furthermore, the predicted UR output in VPP of this moment is [49.96, 65.76] MW. This means VPP utilizes the zero cost UR to bid at a low price. Contrarily, O4 is a competitive conventional generator and its bid price is fixed and relatively high. To conclude, VPP can strategically manipulate the LMP to let its resources scheduled in prior to the other competitive generator on the same node. From hour 11 to 14, net output of UR is negative, and CG is activated to fill the shortage as the black bars depict. VPP turns to purchase energy from the market as the red bars show. Especially in hour 12, the schedule UR is −43.56 MW. CG's output reaches its maximum 40 MW. ES then discharges. CG is applied in priority to cover the inner shortage because of the lower cost compared to ES.
From hour 15 to hour 22, the LMP is higher than the generation cost 20.3$/MW. For example, the LMP of hour 18 is 24.968$/MW. The traded power, the schedule UR and CG are 73.84 MW, 51.31 MW, 22.53 MW, respectively. CG and UR output comprise the scheduled power. Therefore, CG is activated to supply the DA market for profit.
To conclude, the controllable inner resources are coordinately optimized. ES is utilized to shift power from valley hours to peak hours, and CG and ES are operated to fill the power shortage and profit in peak hours. From hour 15 to hour 22, the LMP is higher than the generation cost 20.3$/MW. For example, the LMP of hour 18 is 24.968$/MW. The traded power, the schedule UR and CG are 73.84 MW, 51.31 MW, 22.53 MW, respectively. CG and UR output comprise the scheduled power. Therefore, CG is activated to supply the DA market for profit.
To conclude, the controllable inner resources are coordinately optimized. ES is utilized to shift power from valley hours to peak hours, and CG and ES are operated to fill the power shortage and profit in peak hours. Based on the setting of case 1, we impose a network-congested condition. The calculated power flow of line 2-4 and line 3-6 is 290.911 and 252.293 MW, respectively, in hour 17. Then, we limit the transmission line capacity to be slightly lower than the calculated value, as the third column of Table  3 shows. Results show the bid price of VPP increases from 20.606$/MW to 20.876$/MW. The LMP of node 6 is higher than any of other nodes. For instance, the LMP of node 3 is 20.606$/MW. Meanwhile, the cleared power is not changed according to the fourth row. Consequently, VPP gets more income Based on the setting of case 1, we impose a network-congested condition. The calculated power flow of line 2-4 and line 3-6 is 290.911 and 252.293 MW, respectively, in hour 17. Then, we limit the transmission line capacity to be slightly lower than the calculated value, as the third column of Table 3 shows. Results show the bid price of VPP increases from 20.606$/MW to 20.876$/MW. The LMP of node 6 is higher than any of other nodes. For instance, the LMP of node 3 is 20.606$/MW. Meanwhile, the cleared power is not changed according to the fourth row. Consequently, VPP gets more income from the DA market according to the fifth row. It can be deduced that VPP can utilize the network congestion and gain more profit by strategically increasing LMP. 
VPP Uncertainty Mitigation Results in the RT Market
Switching to the RT stage, we analyze the interval optimization-based imbalance mitigation mechanism coping with uncertainty. According to (20)- (24) , the input uncertainty is caused by UR, and should be mitigated by controllable resources to restrain the deviation of traded power. Figure 9 compares the uncertainty inputted by UR with the mitigated uncertainty of traded power. The interval width remarkably shrinks in peak hours, e.g. in hour 19, the NDP and PDP are 44.9424 $/MWh and 9.9872 $/MWh, respectively. The UR is [61.90,78.82] MW while traded power is [91.9, 91.9] MW, which means the uncertainty turns to zero. Hence, the proposed uncertainty mitigation method is effective in peak hours. It can even wipe out the entire uncertainty.
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Switching to the RT stage, we analyze the interval optimization-based imbalance mitigation mechanism coping with uncertainty. According to (20)-(24), the input uncertainty is caused by UR, and should be mitigated by controllable resources to restrain the deviation of traded power. Figure 9 compares the uncertainty inputted by UR with the mitigated uncertainty of traded power. The interval width remarkably shrinks in peak hours, e.g. in hour 19, the NDP and PDP are 44.9424 $/MWh and 9.9872$/MWh, respectively. The UR is [61.90,78.82] MW while traded power is [91.9, 91.9] MW, which means the uncertainty turns to zero. Hence, the proposed uncertainty mitigation method is effective in peak hours. It can even wipe out the entire uncertainty.
In In order to value the contribution of controllable resources, none of the controllable resources is involved in case 2 to make the comparison. The calculated imbalance cost interval is [−1311.64, 437.21]$. In contrast, with the aid of CG and IL, the imbalance cost interval of case 1 is [0, 486.99]$. Therefore, the interval optimization-based imbalance cost mitigation mechanism can effectively decrease the uncertainty and hence restrain the imbalance cost.
Sensitivity analysis
Given different levels of NDP and PDP in case 3, the optimized profit and imbalance cost are calculated in Table 4 . With the increase of NDP and decrease of PDP factor in the first column, the NDP increases and PDP decreases. The left bound of the imbalance cost in the second column shows that penalty paid for traded power of negative deviation decreases as the NDP increases. Note that the left bound in the first row is −632.14$. The negative value denotes that VPP has to pay 632.12$ to the market operator. From the second row, EMS strictly manages the negative deviation; hence, no penalty occurs with the increasing NDP. On the other hand, the right bound of the imbalance cost shows that income from traded power of positive deviation reduces as the PDP increases, because it is becoming less profitable.
The third column shows the total profit interval of VPP. As NDP increases with decreasing PDP, the profit width increases from 1129.5$ to 1760.5$ according to the fourth column. Simultaneously, the profit midpoint increases from 16,754.5$ to 17,396.5$ according to the fourth column. This indicates that higher level negative deviation charges and lower profitable positive deviation price will allow VPP to achieve higher expected profit with more uncertainty. In order to value the contribution of controllable resources, none of the controllable resources is involved in case 2 to make the comparison. The calculated imbalance cost interval is [−1311.64, 437.21]$. In contrast, with the aid of CG and IL, the imbalance cost interval of case 1 is [0, 486.99]$. Therefore, the interval optimization-based imbalance cost mitigation mechanism can effectively decrease the uncertainty and hence restrain the imbalance cost.
The third column shows the total profit interval of VPP. As NDP increases with decreasing PDP, the profit width increases from 1129.5$ to 1760.5$ according to the fourth column. Simultaneously, the profit midpoint increases from 16,754.5$ to 17,396.5$ according to the fourth column. This indicates that higher level negative deviation charges and lower profitable positive deviation price will allow VPP to achieve higher expected profit with more uncertainty. 
NDP, PDP Factor Imbalance Cost ($) Profit Interval ($) Profit Width ($) Profit Midpoint ($) Ratio
In case 4, the width-midpoint ratio of UR is adjusted from ±5% to ±15% to find the effect of predefined UR uncertainty on the outcome of profit. As column 2 of Table 5 shows, the right bound of the imbalance cost interval increases with the width-midpoint ratio of UR. Consequently, both the left and right bounds of optimized VPP total profit in column 3 are decreased. According to column 4, the increasing predefined uncertainty simultaneously increases the uncertainty of optimized profit and decreases the expected profit denoted by column 5. Therefore, the price maker of VPP should carefully set the interval width of uncertain variables. Although decision makers can use wider intervals to cover more possibility in forecasts, the optimized result will also be more uncertain. In case 5, the relationship between PD and optimized profit is investigated. The right bound and midpoint of total profit increase with PD as the top of the red interval and blue bars show in Figure 11 . When PD is 0.1, the profit interval is [15, 841, 18 ,572]$. When PD is beyond 0.6, the profit interval becomes stable at [15, 283, 21, 156] $. The minimum width of profit is 1365.5 when PD is 0.1. The width holds at 2936.5 from PD 0.6 to PD 0.9. Both the profit interval and midpoint increase with the pessimism degree of VPP decision makers. Therefore, if a decision maker of VPP assumes higher PD, higher possible profit with more uncertainty will be pursued. profit and decreases the expected profit denoted by column 5. Therefore, the price maker of VPP should carefully set the interval width of uncertain variables. Although decision makers can use wider intervals to cover more possibility in forecasts, the optimized result will also be more uncertain. In case 5, the relationship between PD and optimized profit is investigated. The right bound and midpoint of total profit increase with PD as the top of the red interval and blue bars show in Figure 11 . When PD is 0.1, the profit interval is [15, 841, 18 ,572]$. When PD is beyond 0.6, the profit interval becomes stable at [15, 283, 21, 156] $. The minimum width of profit is 1365.5 when PD is 0.1. The width holds at 2936.5 from PD 0.6 to PD 0.9. Both the profit interval and midpoint increase with the pessimism degree of VPP decision makers. Therefore, if a decision maker of VPP assumes higher PD, higher possible profit with more uncertainty will be pursued. 
Conclusions
Among the existing works, this study argues that VPP is a price maker stead of a price taker. Compared with other price maker research, various DERs are integrated to operate coordinately in the manner of VPP. Moreover, the interval optimization method is utilized instead of stochastic optimization. The proposed two-stage bi-level bidding and scheduling interval optimization model is applied to optimize VPP's strategy in the DA and RT market. In the DA stage, optimized results show that VPP's bidding price manipulates the LMP to limit the scheduled power in valley hours and increase its income in peak hours. Compared with a competitive conventional generator on the same node, VPP bids strategically and lets its resources scheduled in prior to the other competitive generator on the same node by utilizing zero-cost UR. VPP can also optimally schedule the ES to shift power from valley hours to peak hours. Inner CG is flexibly applied to cover the inner power 
Among the existing works, this study argues that VPP is a price maker stead of a price taker. Compared with other price maker research, various DERs are integrated to operate coordinately in the manner of VPP. Moreover, the interval optimization method is utilized instead of stochastic optimization. The proposed two-stage bi-level bidding and scheduling interval optimization model is applied to optimize VPP's strategy in the DA and RT market. In the DA stage, optimized results show that VPP's bidding price manipulates the LMP to limit the scheduled power in valley hours and increase its income in peak hours. Compared with a competitive conventional generator on the same node, VPP bids strategically and lets its resources scheduled in prior to the other competitive generator on the same node by utilizing zero-cost UR. VPP can also optimally schedule the ES to shift power from valley hours to peak hours. Inner CG is flexibly applied to cover the inner power shortage and to profit from the market during peak hours. In a network-congested case, VPP will strategically bid higher for more profit. In the RT stage, the proposed interval optimization-based mechanism can effectively reduce the deviation of traded power from the DA schedule and hence restrain the imbalance cost. Various controllable resources are coordinately applied to reduce the uncertainty. A negative imbalance cost can even be entirely wiped out if the NDP is high. Finally, sensitivity analysis shows that VPP tends to achieve higher expected profit with higher uncertainty when NDP is high and PDP is low. The input width of uncertain variables should be carefully set. A wider interval width setting by VPP will increase the uncertainty of results and decrease the expect profit. Last but not least, VPP decision makers of high PD tend to achieve high profit and uncertainty. Since this work is in the viewpoint of strategic VPP, our future work will study the interaction among multi strategic market participants. 
Conflicts of Interest:
The authors declare no conflict of interest. The strong duality condition of the lower level problem stands because of convexity. Therefore, the maximization of lower level problem equals the minimization of its dual problem. 
